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GREAT BRITAIN'S ANSWER TO
HOMELESSNESS: THE HOUSING
(HOMELESS PERSONS) ACT OF 1977
At least one quarter of the world's population lacks adequate hous-
ing, including approximately 100 million persons who are completely
homeless.' Although most homeless persons reside in developing
countries, a surprisingly large number live in industrialized nations.2
While the United States government has not adopted a comprehensive
policy to deal with its homeless population, the British government has
attempted to address this problem at a national level. This section of
the symposium examines Britain's efforts to resolve the problem of
homelessness through the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977.'
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
In an effort to curb increasing homelessness,4 overcrowding, and
sub-standard housing throughout Great Britain,5 Parliament enacted
the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977. This legislation, though
1, Cox, Objectives of the UN International Year of Shelter for the Homeless
(IYSH)-1987, EKISTICS, July-Aug. 1984, at 284.
The United Nations' proclamation of 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for
the Homeless underscores the global magnitude of the problem of homelessness. See
G.A. Res. 221, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 148, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983). For
a general discussion of the IYSH, see Development and International Economic Co-
operation: Human Settlements, Report of the Secretary-General, 40 U.N. GAOR Annex
5 (Agenda Item 84(h)) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/406 (1985), and Cox, supra.
2. In the United States, officials estimate that as many as two million persons may
be homeless. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1984, at Al, col. 2. In England the number of home-
less households, as defined by the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977, totalled
53,100 in 1978, 56,800 in 1979, and 62,420 in 1980. Birkinshaw, Homelessness and the
Law-the Effects and Response to Legislation, 5 URB. L. & POL'Y 255, 256-57 (1982).
3. The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act, 1977, ch. 48 [hereinafter 1977 Act or
Act]. But see Puhlhofer & Hillingdon London Borough Council, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 259,
283, (H.L.) ("It is an Act to Assist persons who are homeless, not an Act to provide
them with homes.").
4. The term "homelessness," in this instance, refers to those persons actually lack-
ing permanent or temporary shelter.
5. See M. PARTINGTON, THE HOUSING (HOMELESS PERSONS) AcT 1977 AND THE
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a significant improvement over prior governmental policies toward the
homeless, 6 is an ineffective and inadequate means of resolving the
problems of many homeless persons.7 Single persons and childless
couples8 who do not meet the criteria for "priority need"9 and other
CODE OF GUIDANCE 48 (1978) (citing Government Green Paper, Housing Policy: A
Consultative Document, Cmnd. 6851, H.M.S.O., 1977).
A decline in housing starts and reductions in public housing expenditures contributed
to the pervasive problem of homelessness. Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at 256. In
Puhlhofer Lord Brightman described Britain's housing problem as intractable. [1986] 2
W.L.R. at 284.
6. Parliament previously addressed the issue of homelessness in the National Assist-
ance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 29, § 21(1)(b) [hereinafter 1948 Act]. The 1977 Act
repealed the National Assistance Act. 1977 Act, § 20. The 1948 Act was not intended
to alleviate general homelessness; it merely required that local housing authorities pro-
vide temporary accommodations were for persons in emergency situations. Accommo-
dations were required when these persons could not have foreseen the urgent
circumstances or when the authorities determined that temporary accommodations
were necessary. See 1948 Act, § 21(l)(b); Smith, The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act
1977-Four Years On, 1982 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 143, 143. Furthermore, the courts
failed to enforce even these limited duties of the local housing authorities under the
1948 Act. Id. at 143.
In 1974 the Department of the Environment called for a more effective policy toward
the homeless. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, CIRCULAR No. 18/74 [here-
inafter DOE CIRCULAR]; Smith, supra, at 144. Some of the measures adopted in the
Department of the Environment circular provided the framework for key provisions of
the 1977 Act. Compare DOE CIRCULAR No. 18/74, paras. 10, 18 with 1977 Act, §§ 2,
19.
7. See Smith, supra note 6, at 156-57. See generally Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at
255; Robson & Watchman, The Homeless Persons' Obstacle Race, 1981 J. Soc. WEL-
FARE L. 1; Woodward & Davidge, Homelessness Four Years On, 1982 J. PLAN. &
ENV'T L. 158.
The original bill as introduced in Parliament would have taken more effective meas-
ures to resolve the problem of homelessness. Because of strong opposition from local
housing authorities in the Association of District Councils and from conservative mem-
bers of Parliament, the final version of the Act contained a number of amendments that
diluted these substantial remedial measures. See M. PARTINOTON, supra note 5; Birkin-
shaw, supra note 2, at 258; Robson & Watchman, supra at 2; Woodward & Davidge,
supra, at 158. See infra notes 21-22.
8. See Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at 259; Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 9;
see also Smith, supra note 6, at 157. See generally Wilkinson, Single & Homeless, 1982
NEW L.J. 503.
Bringing and keeping together families is an important goal of the statute. See Din v.
Wandsworth London Borough Council, [1983] 1 A.C. 657, 663 (1981) (opinion of L.
Wilberforce); In re Islam (Tafuzzul), [1983] 1 A.C. 688, 716 (1981) (opinion of L.
Lowry); R. v. Swansea City Council, exparte Thomas, 9 H.L.R. 64 (Q.B. 1983) (opin-
ion of Woolf, J.); R. v. North Devon Dist. Council, ex parte Lewis, [1981] 1 W.L.R.
328, 333 (Q.B. 1980) (opinion of Woolf, J.); 1977 Act, §§ l(1)(a), 2(l)(a), 2(l)(c), 2(2),
5(1)(a)(i)-(ii), 16; Code of Guidance, para. 4.2, see infra note 36. Courts have held that
local housing authorities must look to the needs of the family unit as a whole and not
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homeless persons who do not satisfy other statutory requirements 0 fail
to qualify for meaningful protection. This is primarily due to the
highly discretionary" decisions of predominantly hostile12 local hous-
ing authorities.
13
A person seeking housing triggers governmental assistance under the
Act by submitting an application to a local housing authority.1 4 Under
section 3 of the Act,' 5 the preliminary duties of housing authorities
arise upon application if the authority has reason to believe that the
applicant may be homeless 6 or threatened with homelessness. 7 These
merely to those of the applicant or head of the family. See Islam, [1981] 1 A.C. at 708
(accommodation was not reasonably available for applicant, wife, and children; there-
fore, they were not intentionally homeless); Thomas, 9 H.L.R. at 64 (deliberate acts of
members of family unit imputed to applicant, tainting his application to the housing
authority); Lewis, [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 333-34 (conduct of one member of the family unit
imputed to applicant, rendering her intentionally homeless); infra note 98.
9. Section 2 of the 1977 Act describes four classes of persons who qualify for prior-
ity need status. 1977 Act, § 2. See infra notes 20, 53-59 and accompanying texts.
10. See text accompanying notes 14-29.
11. See Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at 257; Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 82.
12. Local housing authorities have expressed their opposition to the broad protec-
tion of homeless persons under the Act. See M. PARTINGTON, supra note 5, at 48;
Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at 255, 257-58; Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 2;
supra note 7; infra notes 21-22.
13. Section 19 of the 1977 Act cites to § 1 of the Housing Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2,
ch. 56, § 1, for the definition of "housing authority." 1977 Act, § 19(1). Section 1 of
the 1957 Act provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the local authority for the purposes of
this Act as respects England and Wales other than the administrative county of
London shall be the council of the borough, urban district or rural district.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the local authority for the purposes of
this Act as respects the administrative county of London shall be,-
(a) as respects the City of London, the Common Council,
(b) as respects the administrative county of London other than the City of
London, the metropolitan borough council or the London County Coun-
cil as hereinafter provided.
1957 Act, § 1(2).
14. See 1977 Act, § 3(l)(A).
15. Id. § 3(1).
16. Section 1 of the 1977 Act defines "homelessness" broadly to include persons
with no accommodations and persons who normally reside together with others as a
family but have no accommodations that they as a group are entitled or permitted to
occupy. Id. § 1(1). Thus, Parliament provided for and courts have upheld a loose con-
cept of "family" encompassing more than the traditional family unit. See R. v. Swansea
City Council, ex parte Thomas, 9 H.L.R. 64 (Q.B. 1983) (man and woman living to-
gether with children); R. v. North Devon Dist. Council, ex parte Lewis, [1981] 1
W.L.R. 328 (Q.B. 1980) (man living with woman who was separated from her legal
1987]
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duties include making "appropriate inquiries"1 8 to satisfy the authority
that the applicant is homeless or threatened with homelessness.19 If
the authority is satisfied that the applicant is homeless or threatened
with homelessness, it must then determine whether the applicant has a
"priority need"20 and whether he became homeless or threatened with
husband, and their child). The Secretary of State, who is responsible for promulgating
guidelines under the 1977 Act, has explained that the term "family" should include not
only persons related by blood or marriage, but also persons "living together as if they
were members of a family" such as cohabitating couples and disabled or elderly persons
with housekeepers or other companions. Code of Guidance, para. 2.8, see infra note 36.
See also Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 3 n.13; Smith, supra note 6, at 146-47
and n.21.
Parliament did not provide a precise definition of "accommodations" in the 1977 Act.
In Puhlhofer v. Hiflingdon London Borough Council, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 259 (H.L.), the
House of Lords held that in determining whether an applicant has accommodations
under §§ I and 4 of the Act, an authority should look to the ordinary meaning of the
word and should not read into the statute a requirement of "reasonable" or "appropri-
ate" accommodations. Id. at 283. Lord Brightman explained that applicants residing
in accommodations that violate other statutes because they are unfit for habitation or
overcrowded may still not qualify as homeless persons under § 1. Id. The Lord Justices
stated that what constitutes "accommodations" is a question of fact for local authori-
ties, and that in the instant case they could properly find that the applicants were not
homeless despite their overcrowded situation. Id.
Section 1 includes within its definition of "homelessness" persons who have accom-
modations but cannot secure entry to them; persons who have accommodations but
occupation will probably result in violence or threats of violence from other persons
residing there; and persons with accommodations that are movable structures, vehicles,
or vessels designed or adapted for human habitation but without places where they are
entitled or permitted to reside. 1977 Act, § l(2)(a)-(c).
Persons housed in temporary accommodations may still qualify as homeless under
the Act. See Din v. Wandsworth London Borough Council, [1982] 1 A.C. 657, 677
(1981) (opinion of L. Lowry) ("I consider that to be homeless and to have found some
temporary accommodation are not mutually inconsistent concepts."). The High Court
has held that a woman housed at a refuge for battered wives was homeless within the
meaning of the Act. R. v. London Borough of Ealing, ex parte Sidhu, 2 H.L.R. 45, 3
F.L.R. 438 (Q.B. 1982). The court explained that a contrary result would defeat the
purposes of the Act. Id. See R. v. East Hertfordshire Dist. Council, ex parte Hunt,
[1986] 1 F.L.R. 431 (Q.B. 1985).
17. Section 1 of the Act defines "threatened with homelessness" as the situation in
which a person is likely to become homeless (as defined in this section) within 28 days.
1977 Act, § 1(3).
18. Id.§3.
Under § 11 of the Act, a person is guilty of an offense if he knowingly or recklessly
makes a false statement of a material fact or knowingly withholds information that an
authority reasonably requires him to reveal pursuant to the Act. Id. § 11(1).
19. Local housing authorities have the discretion to determine what constitutes an
"appropriate inquiry" under the Act. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
20. Section 2 of the Act defines "priority need" to include persons with whom de-
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homelessness intentionally.2 1 Moreover, the authority, at its own dis-
cretion, may inquire whether the applicant has a "local connection"
with another housing authority; if so, the former authority may be able
to transfer the applicant to the latter authority.2 2 If the inquiring au-
pendent children reside or might reasonably be expected to reside; persons whose home-
lessness is a result of emergencies or disasters such as floods or fires; persons or others
with whom they reside or may reasonably be expected to reside, who are particularly
vulnerable because of old age, mental illness, physical disability, or other special rea-
sons; and pregnant women or those who reside or might reasonably be expected to
reside with pregnant women. 1977 Act, § 2(l)-(2). In addition, the Secretary of State,
upon approval of both Houses of Parliament, may designate other categories of persons
as having a priority need. Id. § 2(3)-(4). The Code of Guidance describes in detail the
categories of priority need. Code of Guidance, para. 2.12, see infra note 36. See infra
notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 80-113 and accompanying text. Section 17 of the Act describes
the circumstances in which housing authorities should treat persons as intentionally
homeless or threatened with homelessness:
(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, for the purposes of this Act a person be-
comes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything in con-
sequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is available for his
occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to oc-
cupy.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, for the purposes of this Act a person be-
comes threatened with homelessness intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to
do anything the likely result of which is that he will be forced to leave accommoda-
tion which is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable
for him to continue to occupy.
(3) An act or omission in good faith on the part of a person who was unaware
of any relevant fact is not to be treated as deliberate for the purposes of subsection
(1) or (2) above.
(4) Regard may be had, in determining for the purposes of subsections (I) and
(2) above whether it would have been reasonable for a person to continue to occupy
accommodation, to the general circumstances prevailing in relation to housing in
the area of the housing authority to whom he applied for accommodation or for
assistance in obtaining accommodation.
1977 Act, § 17.
The notion of "intentional homelessness" was the major concession that the propo-
nents of the original bill made to the opposition, including local housing authorities. M.
PARTINGTON, supra note 5. See supra note 7. These authorities feared that they would
be burdened with persons who were "self-induced homeless" trying to gain priority on
housing waiting lists by "jumping the queue." Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 9
n.43 (quoting Paul Channon, Conservative Member of Parliament for Southend West,
H.C. Deb., Second Reading, Vol. 926, col. 914). See Smith, supra note 6, at 153. Local
housing authorities favored the statutory requirement of unintentional homelessness be-
cause their duties toward homeless persons under the Act are substantially less when
authorities find that persons are intentionally homeless. See 1977 Act, § 4. See infra
text accompanying notes 27-29.
22. See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text. A person has a "local connec-
tion" with an area if he is now or was in the past normally residing there by his own
1987]
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thority has reason to believe the applicant may be homeless and have a
priority need, it has a duty to ensure that an accommodation is avail-
able for the applicant's occupation pending the results of the inquiry.2 3
After these section 3 inquiries, if the housing authority finds that the
applicant is homeless or threatened with homelessness, more substan-
tial duties arise under section 4 of the Act.24 If a housing official is not
satisfied that an applicant has a priority need, however, the official's
only duty is to provide advice25 and "appropriate assistance."26 When
choice, if he is employed in the area, if he has family associations there, or in any other
special circumstances. 1977 Act, § 18(1). Under § 5 of the Act, a housing authority
may shift its § 4 duty to another authority in order to obtain permanent accommoda-
tion for homeless applicants with priority need if (1) the former authority is of the
opinion that neither the applicant nor anyone who might reasonably be expected to
reside with him has a local connection with the area in which the authority operates;
(2) the applicant or person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him has a
local connection with the latter authority's area; (3) neither the applicant nor any per-
son who might reasonably be expected to reside with him runs the risk of domestic
violence in the latter authority's area; and (4) the former authority properly notifies the
latter authority of the pending application and of its finding that the applicant has no
local connection with its area. Id. § 5.
In any case, the authority from whom the applicant seeks assistance has the duty to
ensure that housing becomes available for occupation. Id. § 5(5). See infra note 29.
This duty rests with the authority, pending a determination of whether a local connec-
tion is present. 1977 Act, § 5(6). Moreover, the Code adds that an authority "may not
seek to transfer responsibility on the ground that the person has a greater connection
with the area of another authority." Code of Guidance, para. 2.20, see infra note 36.
The "local connection" concept was included in the Act as a concession to towns that
feared they would be "magnets" for homeless persons because these towns are located
in resort areas or near major railway stations. Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 12
(quoting H.C. Deb., Second Reading, Vol. 926 (W.R. Rees-Davies), cols. 905, 921, 972
& 973 (Feb. 18, 1977)); M. PARTINGTON, supra note 5, § 48/3; Woodward & Davidge,
supra note 7, at 164. By making inquiries of applicants and finding local connections
with other authorities, these "magnet authorities" could lessen the burden of having a
disproportionate share of homeless persons within their jurisdictions. Robson &
Watchman, supra note 7, at 12.
23. 1977 Act, § 3(4). See infra note 29. Section 16 of the Act defines "accommoda-
tion available for occupation" as an accommodation that is available for occupation
both by the applicant and by any other person who might reasonably be expected to
reside with him. 1977 Act, § 16.
24. See id. § 4. Section 8 of the Act details the housing authority's duties in notify-
ing the applicant of its findings pursuant to its § 3 inquiries. Id. § 8.
25. The Act does not define "advice," but the Code of Guidance states that authori-
ties should give advice and other forms of assistance "as helpfully and constructively as
they are able," including financial advice. Code of Guidance, para. 6.2, see infra note
36. Furthermore, paragraph 6.4 of the Code explains:
Advice and assistance to homeless people and people threatened with homelessness
should always be positive, and include for example advice about the possibility of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/9
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the authority determines that the applicant has a priority need, but
finds that he became homeless or threatened with homelessness inten-
tionally, the authority must do more than merely provide advice and
assistance. The local authority must ensure that accommodations are
available for a period of time reasonable to enable the applicant to se-
cure housing on his own.27
If the housing authority is satisfied that the applicant is threatened
with homelessness, has a priority need, and did not become threatened
with homelessness intentionally, the authority's duty is "to take rea-
sonable steps to secure that accommodation does not cease to be avail-
able for his occupation."" If the local authority finds that the
applicant is homeless, has a priority need, did not become homeless
intentionally, and has no local connection with another housing au-
thority, the authority must ensure that accommodations become avail-
able for his occupation.29
II. DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS OF LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITIES
The 1977 Act delegates broad discriminatory powers30 to predomi-
nantly hostile3" authorities. Courts interpreting the statute have rein-
forced this grant of discretion.32 Thus, authorities exercising these
registration on the housing waiting list, and of help available through a housing aid
centre. Lists of accommodation agencies, hostels, lodgings and provision available
through arrangements with registered housing associations will also be relevant.
Id. para. 6.4.
26. 1977 Act, § 4(2). Section 19(1) defines "appropriate assistance" to mean "such
assistance as a housing authority considers it appropriate in the circumstances to give
[the applicant] in any attempts that he may make to secure that accommodation be-
comes or does not cease to be available for his occupation." Id. § 19(1).
27. Id. § 4(3). See supra note 23.
28. 1977 Act, § 4(4). See Lally v. Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (Ch.
Mar. 21, 1980) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (14-day period held not to be rea-
sonable opportunity to secure accommodation in light of circumstances whereby preg-
nant wife became ill).
29. 1977 Act, § 4(5). A housing authority fulfills this duty by making council hous-
ing available to the applicant, by assuring that he obtains housing from some third
party, or by giving him advice and assistance that will ensure that he obtains housing
from some third party. Id. § 6. The House of Lords has explained that authorities
should not read into the statute a requirement of reasonable or appropriate accommoda-
tions. Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] 2 W.L.R. 259, 283
(H L.). See supra note 16.
30. See Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at 257; Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 82.
31. See supra note 12.
32. See infra notes 41-113 and accompanying text.
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powers may avoid their responsibilities to provide significant housing
assistance to homeless persons under the Act.33
A. The Code of Guidance
The housing authority's discretion in enforcing the Act derives in
part from the non-binding nature of the ministerial guidelines34 that
the Act explicitly authorizes. The language of section 12 of the Act
apparently requires that housing authorities follow any guidelines that
the Secretary of State may periodically promulgate.35 In 1977 the De-
partment of the Environment, the Department of Health & Social Se-
curity, and the Welsh Office issued a Code of Guidance that established
guidelines for local authorities to follow in dealing with both homeless
persons and those threatened with homelessness.36 The Code liberally
interprets the provisions of the 1977 Act that entitle applicants to re-
ceive significant housing assistance.37 Despite the mandatory language
of section 12,38 however, the Court of Appeal in De Falco v. Crawley
Borough Council39 held that the Code of Guidance is not binding on
local authorities but is merely discretionary in nature.' ° Thus, housing
authorities are able to avert the liberal code provisions and restrict the
number of applicants who qualify for significant protection under the
Act.
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
35. Section 12(1) provides:
In relation to homeless persons and persons threatened with homelessness a rele-
vant authority shall have regard in the exercise of their functions to such guidance
as may from time to time be given by the Secretary of State.
1977 Act, § 12(1) (emphasis added).
36. The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act, Code of Guidance (England & Wales)
D.O.E., D.H.S.S., and Welsh Office (1977), reprinted in M. PARTINGTON, supra note 5,
app. [hereinafter Code of Guidance]; Code of Guidance (1983 amendments), reprinted
in Wilkinson, Homeless Persons: The New Code of Guidance, 1983 Nuw L.3. 1029
[hereinafter 1983 Code of Guidance].
37. Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at 274. See Din v. Wandsworth London Borough
Council [1983] 1 A.C. 657, 664 (1981) (Act must be interpreted "with liberality having
regard to its social purposes").
38. See supra note 35. The term "shall" in a statutory provision generally denotes a
mandatory act.
39. [1980] 1 Q.B. 460 (C.A. 1979) (Italian families found intentionally homeless
when they moved to Britain without ensuring that they had permanent accommoda-
tions there).
40. Id. at 477-78.
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B. "Appropriate Inquiries"
Under the Act, a local authority has a duty to make "appropriate
inquiries" to determine whether a person is homeless or threatened
with homelessness, and if so, whether he has a priority need and
whether he became homeless or threatened with homelessness inten-
tionally.41 Because a finding of homelessness, priority need, and inten-
tional homelessness determines the extent of the housing authority's
duties42 toward an applicant seeking accommodations, the nature of
the inquiry takes on great significance. The Act simply provides that
"6appropriate inquiries" are those necessary to satisfy the authority.43
The Code of Guidance, though detailing a list of subjects that should
be covered during inquiry,' merely asks that authorities make their
inquiries as quickly and sympathetically as possible.45
Courts have refrained from imposing strict procedural requirements
on the manner of inquiry and instead seem to require that inquiries
accord with the principles of fairness.4 6 In Lally v. Royal Borough of
Kensington and Chelsea41 the court held that local authorities need
only conduct inquiries of the applicants and that detailed "C.I.D."-
type inquiries are unnecessary.48 Judge Browne-Wilkinson noted, how-
ever, that authorities should make inquiries in a rigorous and fair man-
41. 1977 Act, § 3(l)-(2). The authority may inquire whether the applicant has a
local connection with the area of another housing authority. Id. § 3(3).
42. See id. §§ 3(4), 4(l)-(5).
43. Id. § 3(2).
44. Paragraph 2.2 of the Code provides:
The inquiries will normally cover such matters as the size and structure of the
household, the nature and location of the accommodation last occupied, the rea-
sons for leaving it, the prospects of return, the question of the availability of accom-
modation elsewhere, any particular problems such as illness or handicap, any need
for accommodation at some distance from a violent partner, and the length of time
that the applicant expects to stay in the area. Other relevant matters may include
the place and type of employment, family connections, or attendance at hospitals
or schools.
Code of Guidance, para. 2.2.
45. Id. para. 2.3. The Code provides that authorities should conduct inquiries as to
intentional homelessness in a sensitive and careful manner. Id. para. 2.19.
46. See M. PARTINGTON, supra note 5, § 48/3; Robson & Watchman, supra note 7,
at 66-67. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
47. Ch. Mar. 21, 1980 (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (authority made ade-
quate inquiry when it found that family was intentionally homeless but did not allow a
reasonable time to find other accommodations under § 4(3) of the Act).
48. See Miller v. London Borough of Wandsworth (Ch. Mar. 17, 1980) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, Cases file).
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
210 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:201
ner.49 In addition, an authority must conduct inquiries that provide
the reviewing courts with an adequate factual basis upon which to de-
cide the case.50 Because the authority's inquiries are a question of
fact,5" judicial review of whether the authority conducted an appropri-
ate inquiry is extremely limited. 2
C. "'Priority Need"
Housing authorities also have discretion to determine whether appli-
cants have a "priority need"5 3 under section 2 of the Act. a A determi-
49. Ch. Mar. 21, 1980. See R. v. Penwith Dist. Council, ex parte Kevern,
CO/810/84 (Q.B. Dec. 14, 1985) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
Two recent court decisions held that housing authorities may not assume facts about
which they fail to inquire in order to find intentional homelessness. See R. v. London
Borough of Wandsworth, ex parte Rose, 11 H.L.R. 105 (Q.B. 1983) (authority could
not assume, without inquiry, that applicant failed to act in good faith when she left
secure accommodations in Jamaica to reside with her father in England, where accom-
modations proved to be inadequate); R. v. Reigate & Banstead Council, ex parte Paris,
[1985] F.L.R. 123 (Q.B. 1984) (authority was not entitled to assume without inquiry
that previous accommodation in Italy was available for occupation or that it would
have been reasonable to continue occupation there); see also R. v. West Dorset Dist.
Council, ex parte Phillips, CO/l 14/84 (Q.B. Nov. 15, 1984) (LEXIS, Enggen Library,
Cases file) (authority failed to make proper inquiries whether applicant knew that hus-
band used rent money to buy liquor).
50. See Rose, 11 H.L.R. at 105; Parr v. Wyre Borough Council, 2 H.L.R. 71 (C.A.
1982) (opinion of L.J. Eveleigh).
51. Youngs v. Thanet Dist. Council, 78 L.G.R. 474 (Ch. 1980).
52. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 20. It is immaterial whether priority need arises from one or a
combination of the factors set out within a category. R. v. Waveney Dist. Council, ex
parte Bowers, [1983] 1 Q.B. 238, 245-48 (C.A. 1982) (applicant with brain injury was
"vulnerable" within the meaning of § 2(1)(c)).
Lord Wilberforce described how the Act operates: [The Act] forms part of a com-
plex of duties which local authorities owe to categories of persons seeking housing.
These persons are normally placed on a waiting list, in some areas a very long one,
and are given accommodation according to a points system of priority. Inevitably
every allocation of priority housing to homeless persons must have the effect of
deferring the hopes of persons in other categories, some of whom may have been
waiting for a long time.... [A] decision against priority treatment under this Act
does not mean that nothing can be done for the "homeless" applicants. They can
join the waiting list for a council tenancy ... or they can seek nomination to a
housing association or, with the help of advice, they can seek private sector hous-
ing, with temporary accommodation meanwhile.
Din v. Wandsworth London Borough Council, [1983] 1 A.C. 657, 663-64 (1981).
54. 1977 Act, § 2. The Court of Appeal has noted that the Code of Guidance is
useful to ascertain the degree of vulnerability comprising "priority need." See Bowers,
[1983] 1 Q.B. at 245; Code of Guidance, para. 2.12.
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nation of priority need is important because a homeless applicant
without priority need will receive only advice and appropriate assist-
ance from the authority. 5 If an authority finds that a person has a
priority need and did not become homeless intentionally, a more sub-
stantial duty to secure housing arises.5 6 To qualify for priority need
status under the Act, a person, or someone with whom the person re-
sides, must possess a characteristic, such as pregnancy, mental illness,
physical disability, old age, or living with dependent children, that in-
dicates his particular vulnerability. 7 Thus, by requiring a finding of
priority need, the Act effectively excludes single homeless persons from
its coverage. 8 Moreover, housing authorities may use their discretion
to interpret the Act's priority need classifications narrowly, thereby ex-
cluding persons whom authorities do not wish to protect.
5 9
D. "Local Connection"
A housing authority wields a great deal of discretion in determining
that an applicant has a local connection with another authority. The
former authority, therefore, may transfer the responsibility of securing
accommodations to the latter authority.' Section 5 of the Act, provid-
ing for the transfer of duties between local authorities, was a conces-
sion to certain cities' authorities that feared the burden of housing an
inordinate number of homeless persons because of the cities' proximity
to railway stations or holiday areas. 61 The courts that have interpreted
this provision have responded to these concerns by promoting the lib-
eral transfer of duties. 62 This policy generally operates to the disadvan-
tage of the homeless applicant by compelling him to move away from
his desired place of residence, or even out of the country, in order to
obtain housing.6"
55. 1977 Act, § 4(2). See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 20.
58. See supra note 8. The Secretary of State for the Environment has acknowledged
his department's desire to maintain the priority groups described within the statute. See
Birkinshaw, supra note 2, at 286-87 (quoting statement of Secretary of State for the
Environment, H.C. Deb., Vol. 23, May 13, 1982).
59. Cf supra note 12.
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61. See id.
62. See infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text. See also Woodward & Davidge,
supra note 7, at 165.
63. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. But see R. v. Slough Borough
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One court has used section 6 to avoid the section 5 requirement that
a housing authority may transfer its responsibilities only to other au-
thorities within the country." In R. v. Bristol City Council, ex parte
Browne,65 the divisional court, applying section 6(l)(c),6 6 held that the
authority could fulfill its section 4(5) duty67 to ensure that accommo-
dations became available by transferring an applicant, who had no lo-
cal connection with any area of England,68 to her home country as
long as local officials in the other country were willing to secure accom-
modations for her.6 9 Thus, the court's interpretation of section 6(l)(c)
Council, exparte Ealing London Borough Council, [1981] 1 Q.B. 801 (C.A. 1980). In
Slough the borough council evicted two families who had resided in Slough for several
years. Id. at 808-10. When the families applied for accommodations, the authority
found them intentionally homeless and arranged for temporary housing in Ealing and
Hillingdon, other housing authority areas, because none was available in Slough. Id.
The families then applied to the Ealing and Hillingdon authorities for accommodations,
and these authorities found that the families were unintentionally homeless and that
they had local connections with Slough. Id. The Court of Appeal held that the Ealing
and Hillingdon authorities could transfer the responsibility to insure that accommoda-
tions became available to the Slough authority, which had previously determined that
the families were intentionally homeless. Id. at 810-11. Thus, the Slough court's appli-
cation fo a liberal transfer policy created a curious result. See Woodward & Davidge,
supra note 7, at 165.
64. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
65. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1437 (Q.B.). In Browne the applicant and her seven children
left their home in Tralee, Ireland and moved to Limerick, Ireland because of domestic
violence. Id. at 1439. When her husband discovered her whereabouts, the hostel where
she had been staying arranged for her and her children to go to Bristol, England. Id.
She applied to the Bristol housing authority, which subsequently found that the appli-
cant had a priority need and had become homeless unintentionally. The authority,
therefore, had a duty under § 4(5) of the Act to insure that accommodations became
available for her occupation, despite the fact that she had no local connection with
Bristol. Id. at 1439-40. The authority fulfilled its duty by applying § 6(l)(c) which
allows an authority to comply with its § 4(5) duty by giving the applicant "advice and
assistance as will secure that he obtains accommodation from some other person." Id.
at 1441. The authority, in the course of its inquiries, spoke with the community welfare
officer in Tralee who knew of the husband's violence and gave his assurance that upon
the return of the applicant and her children, they would be provided with suitable ac-
commodation. Id. at 1440. The housing authority reasoned that because the Tralee
official was willing to secure accommodation, the authority could fulfill its duty under
the Act by advising the applicant to return to Tralee and contact the welfare officer, and
then arranging to pay for her return, despite the applicant's desire not to return to
Tralee. Id. at 1440-41.
66. 1977 Act, § 6(1)(c).
67. 1977 Act, § 4(5). See supra text accompanying note 23.
68. But see infra note 71.
69. [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 1442-43. The court upheld the authority's use of§ 6(l)(c) in
fulfilling its duty to the applicant to secure that accommodations become available
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encourages authorities to evade their section 5 duties.70 Most courts
have not extended this decision to cases in which the applicant's home
country was unwilling to secure accommodations.7 1
The House of Lords recently upheld this liberal transfer policy in its
interpretation of section 18(1),72 which defines "local connection.",
73
In Eastleigh Borough Council v. Betts7 4 the Lord Justices held that a
local connection must be founded upon the factors cited in section
18(1), "normal residence," "employment," "family connections," or
"special circumstances," but is not equivalent to any one of these fac-
tors.75 Lord Brightman explained that an authority could establish
under § 4(5). Id. Section 6(l)(c) provides that the duty under §§ 4 and 5 to insure that
accommodations become available for occupation may be fulfilled by giving an appli-
cant "advice and assistance as will secure that he obtains accommodation from some
other person." 1977 Act, § 6(l)(c). The court held that "some other person" could be
someone outside of Great Britain; here, the other person was the welfare officer in
Tralee. See [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 1442. The court further held that the welfare officer's
general offer of housing constituted "accommodation available for occupation" under
§ 16 of the Act, even though the authority and the welfare officer failed to discuss the
specifics of the accommodations. Id. at 1443.
The consequences of the Browne decision are particularly harsh. The court allowed
the local authority to return the unwilling applicant to the country and city from which
she fled because of domestic violence. See supra note 65. The court explained that even
though the applicant had been a victim of domestic violence in Tralee, she did not
necessarily run a risk of violence upon returning there. [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 1443. More-
over, the court permitted the authority to determine "on the barest of evidence" that no
risk of domestic violence would exist upon the applicant's return. Robson & Watch-
man, supra note 7, at 13.
70. See Woodward & Davidge, supra note 7, at 164.
71. See R. v. Hillingdon London Borough Council, ex parte Streeting, [1980] 1
W.L.R. 1425, 1432-33 (C.A.). In Streeting the housing authority found that the appli-
cant had priority need and was not intentionally homeless, but had no local connection
with any British housing authority. Id. at 1431-32. The Court of Appeal held that
nothing in the Act limited an authority's duty to persons with local connections, that
the Act applied to any person without accommodations in Great Britain, and that the
only condition to providing accommodations was that the person must be in the coun-
try lawfully. Id. at 1432-34. The result would have been different if accommodations
had been available outside of the country. Id. at 1433. See Smith, supra note 6, at 153.
72. 1977 act, § 18(1). See supra note 22.
73. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
74. [1983] 2 A.C. 613, 626. In Betts the House of Lords upheld a housing author-
ity's determination that an applicant had no local connection with the area of the au-
thority because he had lived in the area less than six months. Id. at 628. The
authority, therefore, could transfer the responsibility to another authority in an area
with which the applicant had a local connection. Id.
75. Thus, an authority's decision that an applicant was normally resident in its area
would not necessarily mandate a finding of a local connection with the area. See
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guidelines 76 to determine what constitutes "normal residence" under
section 18(1)(a), provided the authority makes its decisions on a case-
by-case basis." Betts apparently allows an authority to find no local
connection with an applicant even if one or more of the section 18(1)
criteria are met.7 8 Thus, the House of Lords has broadened housing
authorities' discretion to find that no connection exists and, conse-
quently, has allowed authorities to shirk their duties under the Act.7 9
E. Intentional Homelessness
The most heavily litigated8" and highly discretionary8' aspect of the
1977 Act is the concept of intentional homelessness, 82 whereby a hous-
ing authority may significantly reduce its duties toward a homeless per-
son by determining that he became homeless intentionally.83 Section
17(1) defines a person as intentionally homeless "if he deliberately does
or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy
accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it
would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy."84 The
courts that have examined the issue of intentional homelessness have
focused on one or more of the various elements comprising this
definition.
First, the definition encompasses both acts and omissions, allowing
an authority to find a person intentionally homeless as a result of his
Watchman, Recent Cases, R. v. Eastleigh Borough Council, exparte Betts, 1984 J. Soc.
WELFARE L. 365, 368.
76. The housing authority based its finding of no local connection on an agreement
issued by the Association of District Councils, the Association of Metropolitan Author-
ities, and the London Boroughs Association which provided that "a working definition
of 'normal residence' should be that the household has been residing for at least 6
months in the area during the previous 12 months." [1983] 2 A.C. at 622.
77. Id. at 627-28 (citing British Oxygen Co. v. Board of Trade, [1971] A.C. 610).
78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79. Cf Watchman, supra note 75, at 368-69 (decision will result in authorities arbi-
trarily finding no local connection, despite the fact that one or more of the § 18(1)
criteria are met, and will lead to disagreements between housing authorities).
80. See Cocks v. Thanet Dist. Council, [1983] 2 A.C. 286, 291 (1982).
81. See Smith, supra note 6, at 156.
82. See supra note 21.
83. See Cocks, [1983] 2 A.C. at 291 (finding of intentional homelessness is of cricual
importance because of practical differences between full housing duties and limited
housing duties).
84. 1977 Act, § 17(1). Section 17(2) similarly defines persons who are threatened
with homelessness intentionally.
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actions or his failure to act.8 5 Second, the intentional homelessness
must be deliberate. The applicant must have deliberately done some-
thing or failed to do something that brought about his homelessness.
8 6
Section 17(3) clearly states that an act or omission in good faith by "a
person who was unaware of any relevant fact" does not constitute de-
liberateness.17 Thus, the courts normally find that deliberate acts or
omissions stem from willful and persistent behavior.8 8 This type of be-
havior is evident when an applicant voluntarily terminates 9 or fails to
retain' ° his tenancy, fails to make a reasonable attempt to pay rent, 91
or takes part in undesirable conduct that results in his eviction.92 In
Devenport v. Salford City Council9 3 the Court of Appeal interpreted
the language of section 17(1) to merely require any deliberate act or
85. 1977 Act, § 17(1). See Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 10.
86. 1977 Act, § 17(1). See Robson & Watchman, supra note 6, at 10-11.
87. 1977 Act, § 17(3).
88. See Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 10-11; See also infra notes 89-92.
But see 1983 Code of Guidance, para. 2.15. Paragraph 2.15 (as amended) provides:
Where ... a person was obliged to sell because he could not keep up the mortgage
repayments, or got into rent arrears, because of real personal or financial difficulties
or because he was incapable of managing his affairs on account of e.g. old age or
mental illness, his acts or omissions should not be regarded as having been deliber-
ate. Where homelessness is the result of serious financial difficulties arising, for
example, from loss of employment or greatly reduced earnings, the applicant
should not normally be regarded as intentionally homeless.
Id.
89. See, e.g., Dyson v. Kerrier Dist. Council [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1205 (C.A.) (young
pregnant girl voluntarily terminated tenancy when she moved away to be near her fam-
ily), Lally v. Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (Ch. Mar. 21, 1980) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, Cases file) (family voluntary abandoned tenancy without indicating an
intent to return).
90. See Miller v. London Borough of Wandsworth, (Ch. Mar. 17, 1980) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, Cases file) (family failed to retain apartment that was damaged by fire
despite authority's warning that this conduct would render them intentionally
homeless).
91. See, e.g., Robinson v. Torbay Borough Council [1982] 1 All E.R. 726 (Q.B.
1981) (applicant's continued failure to make rent payments until landlord brought ac-
tion against him constituted deliberate act that reasonably resulted in eviction); Hamil-
ton Dist. Council v. Brown (H.L. Nov. 25, 1982) (Scot.) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases
file) (applicant's deliberate failure to pay rent allowances resulted in intentional
homelessness).
92. See, e.g., Davenport v. Salford City Council, 8 H.L.R. 54, 4 F.L.R. 744, 82
L.G.R. 89 (C.A. 1983) (family evicted as a result of children's misconduct); R. v.
Slough Borough Council, ex parte Ealing London Borough Council, [1981] 1 Q.B. 801
(C.A. 1980) (family evicted by local authority because of undesirable conduct).
93. 8 H.L.R. 54, 4 F.L.R. 744, 82 L.G.R. 89 (C.A. 1983).
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omission by an applicant. The court rejected the argument that section
17(1) requires a deliberate act or omission with the intention of becom-
ing homeless.94 By expanding the group of persons whose acts or
omissions meet the deliberateness requirement, the court facilitated a
finding of intentional homelessness.95 This interpretation of the statute
provides housing authorities with greater discretion to limit their du-
ties toward homeless persons.
The third requisite element for a finding of intentional homelessness
under section 17(1) is causation. An applicant's deliberate act or omis-
sion must bring about his homeless condition.96 In determining the
chain of causation, housing authorities may examine previous actions
to find the deliberate act or omission that was the catalyst for the series
of events that eventually resulted in homelessness.9 7 Moreover, au-
thorities may further enlarge the broad scope of acts and omissions
causally connected to the resulting homelessness by imputing the acts
and omissions of family members to the applicants.98 Once an author-
94. See Robinson, [1982] 1 All E.R. at 729-31 (continued failure to pay rent until
action brought by landlord constituted deliberate act reasonably resulting in eviction,
despite applicant's unawareness that this conduct would result in eviction). But cf 1983
Code of Guidance, para. 2.15 (when finding an applicant intentionally homeless, au-
thority should be satisfied that the person has acted "with full knowledge of the likely
consequences").
95. See Watchman, Recent Cases, R. v. Salford City Council, ex parte Devenport,
1983 J. Soc. WELFARE L. 353, 355.
96. See 1977 Act, § 17(1); see also Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 9-12.
97. See, e.g., Lambert v. Ealing London Borough Council [1982] 1 W.L.R. 550,
556-57 (C.A.) (accommodations that person left "intentionally" do not have to be the
last accommodations before applying for housing under the Act); Dyson v. Kerrier
Dist. Council, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1205, 1213-15 (C.A.) (proper for authority to look be-
yond circumstances of recent eviction to fact that young pregnant girl had previously
given up secure accommodations to return to the town where her family resided).
The Code of Guidance as initially promulgated in 1977 stated that in determining
intentional homelessness, authorities should look solely at the most immediate cause of
the homelessness. Code of Guidance, para. 2.18. The 1983 amendments, however, have
revised paragraph 2.18. The Code now recognizes that courts have approved the hous-
ing authorities' practice of looking beyond the most immediate cause of homelessness:
"[W]here homelessness arises from loss of accommodation of a temporary nature, it
may therefore be relevant to consider the circumstances in which the previous accom-
modation was given up." 1983 Code of Guidance, para. 2.18. See generally Rat-
tenbury, The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, s.17, Din and the Voluntary
Homeless, 1983 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 4, 8-16.
98. Because the courts have required that housing authorities consider the needs of
the family unit as a whole, see supra note 8, the deliberate acts or omissions of a member
of a family unit may be imputed to the applicant, rendering him intentionally homeless.
See, eg., R. v. Swansea City Council, ex parte Thomas, 9 H.L.R. 64 (Q.B. 1983) (co-
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ity finds a person intentionally homeless, however, certain intervening
events may occur to change his status to unintentionally homeless
upon reapplication to the authority.9 9
In Din v. Wandsworth London Borough Council" the court held
that the material date for determining whether or not an applicant is
intentionally homeless is the date when he vacated the premises, and
habitee's anti-social behavior imputed to applicant who was in prison during such con-
duct); R. v. North Devon Dist. Council, ex parte Lewis, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 328 (Q.B.
1980) (co-habitee's voluntary termination of employment imputed to applicant);
Devenport, 8 H.L.R. at 54, 4 F.L.R. at 744, 82 L.G.R. at 89 (children's misconduct
constituting a nuisance or annoyance to neighbors imputed to parents). The Thomas
and Lewis courts held that an applicant's acquiescence to his co-habitee's deliberate act
entitles the housing authority to impute this act to the applicant and to find that the act
caused him to become homeless intentionally. See Thomas, 9 H.L.R. at 64; Lewis,
[1981] 1 W.L.R. at 334. The Thomas court, however, cautioned that housing authori-
ties should not automatically assume that the applicant is a party to the deliberate act or
omission of another member of his family unit and should make specific inquiries to this
effect. 9 H.L.R. at 64. See R. v. West Dorset Dist. Council, ex parte Phillips,
CO/1 14/84 (Q.B. Nov. 15, 1984) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). The court noted
that the authority's finding should depend on the particular facts of each case. Id. But
cf Lewis, [1981] 1 W.L.R. at 333 (reasonable for authority to look at the family unit as
a whole and assume, in the absence of contrary evidence, that applicant was a party to
the deliberate act of another member of the family unit). The Thomas case indicates
that an applicant must actively disassociate himself from the acts or omissions that
constitute the grounds for a finding of intentional homelessness. See Watchman, Recent
Cases, R. Y. Swansea City Council, ex parte Thomas, 1983 J. Soc. WELFARE L. 356, 357.
99. Thus, the initial state of intentional homelessness does not necessarily continue.
See Youngs v. Thanet Dist. Council, 78 L.G.R. 474 (Ch. 1980) (applicant was no longer
intentionally homeless after being forced out of accommodations that he had found on
his own); Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 4-6; cf R. v. Slough Borough Council,
ex parte Ealing London Borough Council, [1981) 1 Q.B. 801 (C.A. 1980) (authorities
transferred back responsibility to insure that accommodations became available to an-
other authority that had previously determined that applicants were intentionally home-
less). But see Lambert [1982] 1 W.L.R. at 557 (status of intentional homelessness not
affected by acquiring temporary vacation rentals); Delahaye v. Oswestry Borough
Council, SJ 42a/80 (A.B. 1980) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (no change in appli-
cant's intentionally homeless status when he reapplied after authority evicted his family
from temporary accommodations).
100. [1983] 1 A.C. 657, 666-68 (1981). In Din a family suffering from financial
difficulties disregarded the housing authority's advice to stay on the premises until the
court issued an order for possession. Id. at 665. Upon receiving a distress warrant, the
family moved into overcrowded temporary housing with relatives. Id. After their rela-
tives forced the family to leave, they applied to the authority for permanent accommo-
dations. Id. at 666. Housing officials refused to provide assistance because the
applicants had become homeless intentionally by voluntarily leaving their original ac-
commodations before receiving the court order for possession. Id. See generally Rat-
tenbury, supra note 97.
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other events1°1 that may have occurred prior to applying to the hous-
ing authority are irrelevant. Thus, because the applicant prematurely
left his accommodations before receiving a court order mandating his
eviction, the authority could properly find that he deliberately caused
his homeless condition." 2 To find unintentional homelessness, some
lower courts have not required applicants to remain on the premises
until they receive an actual court order for possession. Rather, these
courts merely require a threat of imminent eviction.'0 3 On the whole,
however, courts have accepted housing authorities' determinations that
the requisite causal connections exist between applicants' deliberate
acts or omissions and their resulting homelessness."
The fourth requirement of section 17(1) allows an authority to find
an applicant intentionally homeless if his deliberate act or omission re-
sulted in his ceasing to occupy accommodations that were available for
his occupation.1°5 The House of Lords interpreted the availability re-
quirement10 6 less broadly than the local authority in In re Islam
(Tafazzul), 10 7 holding that the accommodations in question were not
available for occupation."18
101. These hypothetical events include the following: (1) the applicant would have
remained on the premises; (2) he would have received a court order for possession forc-
ing his eviction; and (3) the authority then would have found him to be unintentionally
homeless. See [1983] 1 A.C. at 667.
102. Id. at 671. See generally Rattenbury, supra note 97, at 16-18.
103. See R. v. Surrey Heath Borough Council, ex parte Li, 16 H.L.R. 79 [1985]
F.L.R. 38 (Q.B. 1984); R. v. Portsmouth City Council, exparte Knight, 10 H.L.R. 115,
[1984] F.L.R. 899, 82 L.G.R. 184 (Q.B. 1983).
104. See supra notes 97-98, 100-02 and accompanying texts.
105. 1977 Act, § 17(1).
106. See Rattenbury, supra note 97, at 5-8.
107. [1983] 1 A.C. 688, 708, 716 (1981). In Islam a Bangladesh applicant who was
a resident of England sent for his wife and children to join him from Bangladesh where
they had lived with his parents. Id. at 707. After their arrival, he and his family lacked
adequate accommodations and became homeless. Id. The authority found that the ap-
plicant had become intentionally homeless because he deliberately arranged for his wife
and children to leave accommodations that they could reasonably have continued to
occupy. Id. at 707-08. Speaking for the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning upheld the
authority's decision, explaining that the applicant, though having resided in England for
16 years, "occupied" the home in Bangladesh through his wife and family. R. v. Hil-
lingdon London Borough Council, ex parte Islam (Tafazzul), [1983] 1 A.C. 688, 694
(1981). The House of Lords reversed the lower court's decision, rejecting the notion
that the applicant had left accommodations that were available for occupation by his
family under §§ 16 and 17 of the Act. [1983] 1 A.C. at 708, 716.
108. The Court of Appeal decision in Islam reflects a xenophobic attitude on the
part of the majority and their efforts to use the Homeless Persons Act as a means of
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The final factor necessary for a finding of intentional homelessness is
the unsuitability of prior accommodations. 0 9 Courts have also con-
strued the suitability element less liberally than local authorities.I"0
Local authorities usually adopt the prevailing attitude among housing
authorities.1. and attempt to prevent aliens and non-residents from ob-
taining benefits under the 1977 Act.
1 12
immigration control. See Woodward & Davidge, supra note 7, at 166-67; see also
Smith, supra note 6, at 155. Lord Denning displayed this attitude when he declared:
"The moral of this case is that men from overseas should not bring their wives and
children here unless they have arranged permanent and suitable accommodation for
them to come to." [1983] 1 A.C. at 695. See De Falco v. Crawley Borough Council
[1980] 1 Q.B. 460, 472, 477-78 (C.A. 1979) (opinion of L. Denning) (Italian families
held intentionally homeless because they came to England without ensuring that they
had permanent accommodations). But see R. v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Bor-
ough Council, exparte Duro-Rama, 9 H.L.R. 71 (Q.B. 1983); R. v. Reigate & Banstead
Council, exparte Paris, [1985] F.L.R. 123 (Q.B. 1984); R. v. London Borough of Wand-
sworth, exparte Rose, 11 H.L.R. 105 (Q.B. 1983).
109. See Rattenbury, supra note 97, at 5-8.
110. See Duro-Rama, 9 H.L.R. at 71; Paris, [1985] F.L.R. at 123. In Duro-Rama
the High Court held that in determining whether or not it was reasonable for an appli-
cant to continue to occupy available accommodations, a housing authority is entitled to
take into account non-housing circumstances. 9 H.L.R. at 71. In this case, the author-
ity was entitled to take into account the fact that the Spanish nationals with a right of
abode in the United Kingdom had no opportunity to work in Spain, where they had
been residing, and were not eligible for unemployment benefits there. Id. The court
rejected the housing authority's argument that § 17(4) of the Act, which states that the
authority may have regard to general housing circumstances prevailing in the area of
application, is the sole factor to which an authority may look when determining
whether the applicant has met the suitability requirement of § 17(1). Id. In addition,
the Paris court held that a housing authority may not assume that an applicant's accom-
modations are suitable without expressly inquiring into the matter. [1985] F.L.R. at
123. But see De Falco, [1980] 1 Q.B. at 482-84.
One court deferred to an authority's finding of suitability despite evidence that ac-
commodations were unfit for human habitation. See R. v. Borough of Dinefwr, exparte
Marshall, CO/623/84 (Q.B. Nov. 13, 1984) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (ac-
commodations suitable despite inadequate supply of electricity and unwholesome tap
water).
111. See, e.g., Islam, [1983] 1 A.C. at 688 (authority found Bangladesh family to be
intentionally homeless); De Falco, [1980] 1 Q.B. at 460 (authority found Italian families
to be intentionally homeless); Paris, [1985] F.L.R. at 123 (authority determined that
Italian husband, English wife, and their child, all previously living in Italy, were inten-
tionally homeless); Duro-Rama, 9 H.L.R. at 71 (authority found Spanish family to be
intentionally homeless); Rose, 11 H.L.R. at 105 (authority found that English mother
and child, previously living in Jamaica, were intentionally homeless); R. v. Bristol City
Council, ex parte Browne, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1437 (Q.B.) authority determined that Irish
mother and her children had no local connection and transferred them back to Ireland).
112. See supra note 108.
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Thus, in some respects the courts have occasionally provided a check
on housing authorities' discretionary decisions regarding intentional
homelessness. The judiciary, however, has too often upheld findings of
intentional homelessness that enable authorities to provide considera-
bly less assistance to applicants under the Act. 113
III. REMEDIES
The 1977 Act does not specifically provide for the enforcement of
housing authorities' duties.' 14 In Cocks v. Thanet District Council " 5
the House of Lords held that an application for judicial review" 6 is the
appropriate procedure to challenge an authority's discretionary deci-
sion.117 More specifically, the Lord Justices ruled that the only appro-
priate means for an unsuccessful applicant to attack an authority's
adverse decision. .is through an order of certiorari to quash the deci-
sion or an order of mandamus to compel the authority to reconsider its
113. See supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
114. Robson & Watchman, supra note 7, at 73; Smith, supra note 6, at 150.
115. [1983] 2 A.C. 286, 294-95 (1982). See generally Robson & Watchman, supra
note 7, at 75-78.
116. Judicial Review is available pursuant to Rules of Supreme Court Order 53, as
amended. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 31.
Courts are limited in their review of local authorities' decisionmaking by the princi-
ples articulated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp.,
[1948] 1 K.B. 223, 228-29 (C.A. 1947). See Cocks, [1983] 2 A.C. at 292. The Wednes-
bury standards, which a court must use to review an authority's decision, are as follows:
(1) the exercise of discretion must be real; (2) the local authority must consider matters
that the statute requires it to consider and must disregard all irrelevant and collateral
matters; (3) the authority must not act dishonestly or in bad faith; and (4) the court may
nonetheless intervene if it determines that the local authority's decision is unreasonable,
rendering its determination an absurdity. Wednesbury, [1948] 1 K.B. at 228-29. In
Cocks the House of Lords recognized the Wednesbury guidelines and other limited
means by which a party may challenge an authority's exercise of statutory powers, in-
cluding the grounds of bias or procedural unfairness. [1983] 2 A.C. at 292.
117. More recently, the House of Lords noted in dicta that courts should exercise
great restraint in giving leave to proceed by judicial review. Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon
London Borough Council, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 259, 284 (H.L.). The court stated that ex-
cept in rare cases persons should not use judicial review to monitor the authorities'
actions under the statute. Id. Lord Brightman further explained that courts should
overturn authorities' public law decisions only if the administrative bodies have acted
perversely. Id. at 284.
118. In Cocks Lord Bridge explained that housing authorities' decisionmaking du-
ties under the Act constitute public law functions, including discretionary determina-
tions as to appropriate inquiries, priority need, local connections, and intentional
homelessness. See [1983] 2 A.C. at 292.
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decision under the law. 19 An applicant may bring an action seeking
an injunction and damages only after the authority establishes that it
owes a duty to the applicant under the Act.12 ° Thus, a proper public
law decision is a condition precedent to the establishment of a private
law duty giving rise to injunctive or monetary relief.121 In limiting the
judiciary to this type of deferential review of authorities' decisionmak-
ing, the Cocks decision enables hostile authorities to undermine the
purposes of the Act by finding that they have no substantial duties to
assist the homeless.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Parliament enacted the 1977 Act to afford greater protec-
tion to the increasing number of homeless persons, 22 several impedi-
ments prevent the achievement of this goal. First, the statutory
language itself narrows the scope of the protected classes through the
stringent requirements of priority need.' 23 While providing some relief
for select groups, the Act falls far short of establishing any meaningful
protection to single homeless persons and childless couples.124 Second,
the statute grants vast decisionmaking powers to hostile housing au-
thorities that generally use their discretion to substantially limit their
duties toward the homeless.' 2 5 Thus, authorities' decisions regarding
appropriate inquiries, priority need, local connections, and intentional
homelessness tend to result in minimal protection for homeless appli-
cants. Third, the judiciary encourages authorities to avoid their statu-
tory responsibilities through its interpretation of the Act' 2 6 and its
limited review of authorities' discretionary decisions.' 2 7 Together, the
statutory language and judicial decisions enable housing authorities to
provide only minimal assistance to select groups of homeless persons.
119. Id. at 295. Lord Bridge noted that the rationale for limited judicial review is
that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the housing authorities. Id.
120. Id. at 292-93. See Thornton v. Kirklees Metro. Council, [1979] I Q.B. 626,
642-43 (C.A.).
121. Cocks, [1983] 2 A.C. at 293.
122. See supra note 5.
123. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 8.
125. See supra note 11.
126. See supra notes 30-113 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
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Given the hostility of housing authorities12 8 and the tremendous
amount of discretion that authorities have in carrying out statutory
procedures,129 the courts should interpret the Act broadly to afford
greater protection to the homeless. Though courts are constrained by
the principles of judicial review, 3° they can and should do more than
merely defer to authorities' decisions. The judiciary has the power to
rule that administrative bodies have acted unreasonably,13 1 and such
rulings would provide the necessary direction to local authorities en-
forcing the Act. The only other means of providing more substantial
protection would be to amend the statute to significantly limit authori-
ties' discretionary decisionmaking. Because members of Parliament
must answer to their local constituents, including hostile authorities
and local governments that do not want the burden of providing hous-
ing for the homeless,13 2 the judiciary must make the effort to liberally
interpret statutory requirements, especially the finding of unintentional
homelessness. 133 Otherwise, housing authorities will continue to shirk
their responsibilities and thereby undermine the purposes of the Act.
The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977, Britain's response to
the plight of its homeless, provides a model for United States legislators
contemplating the adoption of a comprehensive scheme to address this
problem at a national level. An American counterpart to the British
statute should provide significant guidelines and refrain from granting
extraordinary decisionmaking powers to local officials who enforce the
legislation. Thus, local administrators, who may be reluctant to pro-
vide significant assistance, will not be able to take advantage of the
system by avoiding their statutory obligations to homeless persons
seeking aid. Additionally, a United States counterpart should provide
more meaningful protection to single persons and childless couples
who are homeless. Finally, the courts must be willing to provide a
more substantive review of housing officials' decisions and not merely
defer to administrative findings. If Congress and the courts are aware
128. See supra note 12.
129. See supra note 11.
130. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 116.
132. See supra note 12.
133. See supra notes 80-113 and accompanying text.
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of the pitfalls of the British Act and seek to rectify them, homeless
persons in the United States will reap the benefits.
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